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I. General Remarks 
 
1. This submission provides observations and recommendations for an enlightened 
interpretation of apostasy in Islamic law that deconstructs the notion that it is a 
capital crime and demonstrates the legitimacy of freedom of religion or belief in 
Islam.  
2. Part II of this submission will present (a) an overview of Islamic law; (b) the 
religious basis for the criminalization of apostasy as a capital crime; and (c) an 
alternative interpretation in light of Muslim jurists’ views on the issue. 
3. This interpretation can be used to remove apostasy as a capital crime in Muslim 
jurisdictions and promote the fundamental right of freedom of religion or belief. 
4. Part III of this submission will consider the apostasy laws in Sudan with a specific 
focus on the case of Meriam Ibrahim. This will be placed in the context of Islamic 
law, with reference to Part II, and the relevant international law namely Articles 6 
and 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
5. Part IV offers concluding remarks and recommendations.       
      
II. Islamic Law and Apostasy 
 
a. The Foundation of Islamic Law  
 
6. Sharia2 is an overarching concept inclusive of legal and non-legal rulings. Fiqh is 
the discipline where scholars have attempted to interpret the Sharia, i.e the Qur'an 
(the word of God) and the Sunnah (sayings, actions and tacit approvals of the 
Prophet Muhammad), to derive rulings.  
7. Sharia is the divine whereas fiqh is man-made, it is the human attempt to interpret 
the divine. These interpretive discourses have crystallised into various schools of 
thought known as madhāhib, the four main Sunni schools being Ḥanafī, Mālikī, 
Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī which were named after their eponyms. These four schools of 
thought and their varying interpretations are attributed to different understandings 
of fiqh.  
8. Islamic law categorises penal law into three types of crime: ḥudūd, qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr.3  
9. Ḥudūd (singular ḥadd) literally means ‘limits’ which have been defined by jurists 
as offenses whose punishments are fixed and are God’s right.4 
10. The Qur’an discuses ‘ḥudūd Allah’ (limits of God) cautioning Muslims against 
transgressing them or approaching them.5 Ḥudūd in the context of designating 
particular crimes do not appear in the Qur’an, but rather have been characterised by 
the juristic formulations of fiqh. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728H/1328) noted that the 
 
2 Arabic terms are italicized and transliterated except when the word in question has an accepted English spelling 
such as ‘Qur’an’, ‘Sunnah’, ‘Hadith’ and ‘fiqh’. All other Arabic terms are italicized and transliterated according 
to the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).  
3 See Abdul Qadir Oudeh, Criminal Law of Islam (S Zakir Aijaz tr, Kitab Bhavan 1999); Muhammad Abu Zahrah, 
al-Jarima wa al-Uquba fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (Dār al-Fikr al-Arabi, n.d).  
4 ibid. 
5 See Qur’an, 2:187. 
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identification of crimes, their definitions and corresponding punishments, were the 
result of human reasoning rather than from scripture.6 Contemporary Islamic 
scholar, Jonathan Brown, has observed that ‘early Muslim jurists probably inherited 
the concept of a category of crimes called Ḥudūd from references to it made by the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) and the early generations of Muslims.’7 
11. The ḥudūd offences include adultery/fornication (zinā), accusing someone of 
fornication (qadhf), consuming intoxicants (shurb al-khamr), some types of theft 
(sariqa), armed robbery/banditry (ḥirāba), and apostasy (ridda).  
12. Of these ḥudūd offences, three have been interpreted to incur the death penalty. 
They are adultery, apostasy and banditry.  Apostasy is the focus of this discussion. 
 
b. Apostasy as a Capital Crime: The Religious Basis 
 
13. In all four classical schools, the punishment for apostasy is death as illustrated in 
their fiqh literature. However, Mohammad Kamali notes that ‘despite the 
remarkable consistency that one finds on this point, the issue of punishment by 
death for apostasy is controversial, and various opinions have been recorded on the 
matter ever since the early days of Islam’.8 
14. Moreover, the manner in which the term apostasy was used and interpreted in the 
early days of Islam suggests a separation between apostasy simpliciter and political 
apostasy akin to treason or warfare. In agreement with this, Brown has argued that 
‘[t]he way that the early Muslim community seems to have understood apostasy 
differs strikingly from the decisive rulings of the later schools of law’.9  
15. The Qur’an’s emphasis on freedom of religion10 is prima facie incompatible with a 
criminalisation of apostasy. The term for apostasy is used only twice in the Qur’an, 
in 2:217 and 5:54.11 A return to unbelief after belief is explicitly mentioned in both 
verses yet neither stipulate death as the punishment for return to disbelief. 
16. After assessing all the commentaries by the classical exegetes on these verses of 
apostasy, Declan O’ Sullivan notes that what becomes apparent is that none of them 
indicate or make any reference to the death penalty as a fitting punishment for 
apostasy, or that such a ruling is derived from these verses.12  
17. Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the retired Chief Justice of Pakistan, argues that the mere 
act of apostasy does not necessitate the death penalty because ‘in the early years of 
Islam, the fact that persons who defected from the religion also joined the enemy 
 
6 Jonathan AC Brown, Stoning and Hand Cutting: Understanding the Hudud and the Shariah in Islam (Yaqeen 
Institute for Islamic Research 2017) 5. 
7 ibid. 
8 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Islamic Texts Society 1997) 213. 
9 Jonathan AC Brown, ‘The Issue of Apostasy in Islam’ (Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research 2017) 14. 
10 See eg 22:17; 2:256; 109:1-6; 88:22-24; 10:99-100; 18:29. 
11 Taha Jabir Alalwani also cites a number of other verses he believes serve to expound the essence of apostasy: 
3:86; 3:90; 3:91; 3:98; 3:106; 3:177; 4:137; 16:106: 22:11; 47:32. See Alalwani, Apostasy in Islam (International 
Institute of Islamic Thought 2011) 25-27. 
12 See Declan O Sullivan, Punishing Apostasy: The Case of Islam and Shari’a Law Re-considered (DPhil thesis, 
Durham University 2003) for a comprehensive assessment of the verses dealing with apostasy; SA Rahman, 
Punishment of Apostasy in Islam (2nd edn, Kitab Bhavan 2006) 54. 
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groups, may have obscured the distinction between peaceful renegades and 
apostates who actively opposed the faithful’.13 
18. Whilst the Qur’an is largely silent on the death penalty for apostasy, the punishment 
takes root in three main Hadiths (prophetic narrations). However, these must be 
read holistically in light of other Hadiths, for example the narration which permits 
the death penalty for “the one who reverts from Islam (apostate) and leaves the 
community’.14 
19. This Hadith has been narrated with minor variations which seem to qualify what is 
meant by a person who has abandoned his religion. In some versions, such as above, 
the apostate is qualified with the phrase al-mufāriq li-l-jamāʿa (the one who 
forsakes the community)15 which suggests hostility and political betrayal. In 
another version, the one who ‘makes war on God and His Messenger’ (yuḥārib 
Allāh wa rasūlahu) is added.16 
20. Scholars have also made references to the practice of the Prophet to demonstrate 
that apostasy simpliciter was not a death penalty offence.17 Moreover, Ibn al- Ṭallāʿ 
(d. 497/1104) observes that no reliable instance is reported where the Prophet 
executed anyone for apostasy.18 
 
c. An Alternative Interpretation  
 
21. Some scholars have compared the apostasy denounced in Hadith literature as 
analogous to the offence of high treason, thus differentiating between ‘political 
apostasy’ and ‘religious apostasy’.19 Early Muslim jurists were concerned with the 
public element of apostasy and its ramifications for maintaining political order. 
Notable Hanafi jurists such as al-Sarakshī (d. 490H/1096), Ibn al-Humām (d. 
861H/1457) and Ibn al-Sāʿātī (d. 694H/1295) discussed apostasy in their writings 
on interstate politics (kitāb al-siyar) and not criminal punishments.20  
22. Al-Sarakshī favoured the ruling of Abū Ḥanīfa that female apostates are exempt 
from the death penalty and are to be imprisoned until they repent. He relied on 
narrations wherein female apostates were killed only when they were enemy 
combatants or inciting war against the Muslims.21 What becomes evident here is 
 
13 Rahman (n 11) 45. 
14 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 6878; Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, no. 1676.  
15 This is narrated from Ibn Masʿūd. The main narrations of this Hadith all have the wording al-tārik li-dīnihi al-
mufāriq li-l-jamāʿa or al-mufāriq li-dīnihi al-tārik al-jamāʿa. Some narrations of this Hadith that are both less 
reliable and less common instead contain the wording ‘for unbelief after Islam’ and ‘for apostasy after Islam.’  
16 This is narrated from ʿĀʿisha. See eg, al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, no. 4355; al-Nasāʾī, Sunan al-Nasāʾī, no. 
4048. 
17 See eg Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition 
(CUP 2003) 125-26; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Freedom of Religion in Islamic Law’ (1992) 21 Capital 
University Law Review 63, 74; Alalwani (n 10) 42-67; Rahman (n 11) 63. 
18 Muḥammad b. Faraj al-Qurṭubī Ibn al-Ṭallāʿ, Aqḍiyat Rasūl Allāh (also known as al-Aḥkām) (Fāris Fatḥī 
Ibrāhim ed, Dār Ibn al-Haytham 1426/2006) 24. 
19 Alalwani (n 10) 97-116. 
20 Jonathan Brown (n 8) 12. 
21 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ (Dār al-Maʿrifa n.d) 10:110. 
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that although al-Sarakshī held apostasy as a capital offence, it was linked to the 
meaning of apostasy as a political act, not mere renunciation of faith.  
23. In agreement with this is the widely cited opinion of Ibn al-Humām who argued 
that: 
It is necessary to punish apostasy with death in order to avert the 
evil of war, not as punishment for the act of unbelief, its 
punishment [disbelief] is greater and with Allah, Most High. This 
[punishment of death] is specifically for him who comes with war 
and is a man; this is because the Prophet prohibited killing 
women.22   
This is a significant statement which is in harmony with the letter and spirit of the 
Qur’an, demonstrating that mere apostasy does not incur a death sentence. 
24. The Mālikī jurist Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081) noted that apostasy is ‘a sin 
for which there is no ḥadd punishment’.23 Other prominent Islamic jurists such as 
Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96/717) and Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) held that the 
apostate should be given the opportunity to repent forever (yustatābu abadan)24 or 
in another version, as long as there is hope for his repentance (yuʾajjal mā rujiyat 
tawbatuhu).25 It is likely that al-Nakhaʿī meant a repeat apostate is to be given a 
chance to repent each time.26  
25. Maḥmūd Shaltūt, Shaykh al-Azhar (d.1963) further argued that the death penalty 
for apostasy is based on solitary Hadith and ḥudūd cannot be established with 
them.27  
26. The way in which Muslim jurists have described apostasy showed that it was 
understood as a threat to political order. Some jurists have considered apostasy to 
fall within the remit of taʿzīr and thus at the State’s discretion to punish.28 
27. There is also considerable scope for the punishment for political apostasy to be 
arbitrarily applied, and for political opposition members to be unfairly tried and 
cruelly put to death. 
28. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the death penalty is a deterrent for either 
religious apostasy or political apostasy. It is thus an ineffective implementation of 
ḥadd punishment. The death penalty does not contribute to maintaining nor 
improving the social and political lives of Muslims.  
 
 
 
22 Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr ʿalā al-Hidāya Sharḥ Bidāya al-Mubtadī (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya 
1424/2003) 6:68 (emphasis added). 
23 Abū al-Walīd Sulaymān b. Khalaf al-Bājī, al-Muntaqā Sharḥ Muwaṭṭa’ al-Imām Mālik (2nd edn, Dār al-Kitāb 
al-Islāmī n.d) 5:282. 
24 al-Ṣanʿānī, Muṣannaf, 10:166; al-Bayhaqī, al-Sunan al-Kubrā, 8:197; Nazwī, Muṣannaf, 11:190; Ibn Qudāma, 
al-Mughnī, 12:268; al-ʿAynī, al-Bināya fī Sharḥ al-Hidāya, 7:268; Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 11:191; al-Nawawī, 
al-Majmuʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, 21:66. 
25 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl ‘alā Shātim al-Rasūl (Muḥammad Muḥyi al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ed, Maktaba 
al-Tāj 1960) 321. 
26 al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ Kitāb al-Siyar al-Kabīr (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1417/1997) 5:166-67; Brown (n 19) 14. 
27 Maḥmūd Shaltūt, al-Islām: Aqīda wa Sharīʿa (Matbabi’ Dār al-Qalam n.d) 292-93.  
28 Mohamed S El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law (American Trust Publications 1993) 55.  
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III. Sudan, Apostasy and the Case of Meriam Ibrahim 
 
29. Sudan is a Muslim-majority State. Under the 2005 Interim National Constitution 
(INC), three Articles refer explicitly to Islam. Article 5(1) identifies that 
‘[n]ationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of the Northern states 
of the Sudan shall have as its sources of legislation Islamic Sharia and the consensus 
of the people.’ Article 156(d) calls on judges and law enforcement agencies to 
observe ‘the long-established Sharia principle that non-Muslims are not subject to 
prescribed penalties and therefore remitted penalties shall apply according to law’. 
Finally, under Article157(1)(b), the Non-Muslim Rights Commission must ensure 
that ‘Non-Muslims are not adversely affected by the application of the Sharia law 
in the National Capital’. This contradicts the position of non-Muslims in the 
Criminal Act 1991 which does not make such a distinction.  
30. Article 36 of the INC maintains the sovereign right to impose the death penalty with 
apostasy specifically addressed as a capital crime in Sudan’s Criminal Act 1991.29  
The case of Sudanese citizen Meriam Ibrahim demonstrates this law in practice. 
31. On 15 May 2014, Meriam Ibrahim was sentenced to death for apostasy pursuant to 
Article 126 of the Sudanese Criminal Act. The case received widespread media 
coverage and international outcry with the UN Independent Expert receiving 
numerous complaints about the case.30 The defence petition held that Meriam’s 
personal faith and beliefs had been misrepresented. In September 2013, a man 
claiming to be Meriam’s brother informed the authorities that she was a Muslim 
and as such was cohabiting illegally with a Christian man (whom she had in fact 
married). It is only then that the authorities became aware of the Ibrahim family. 
The Al-Haj Yousef Criminal Court pronounced her church marriage invalid due to 
her Muslim faith and upbringing, which was built upon the court testimonies of 
several family members. She was provided with an ultimatum of recanting her faith 
within three days or face sentence of death. Meriam affirmed her Christian faith 
declaring she had never committed apostasy and was subsequently sentenced. The 
defence argued that Meriam had been a devout Christian and met her husband, 
Daniel Wani, whilst a practising Christian. The Court of Appeal overturned the 
conviction on 23 June and Meriam was released from prison.31  
32. According to the UN Independent Expert, Mashood A Baderin, ‘the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling overturning the decision of the lower court in this case is 
commendable in the interest of justice from the perspective of both Islamic law and 
 
29 Article 126(1) states: ‘Whoever propagates the renunciation of Islam or publicly renounces it by explicit words 
or an act of definitive indication is said to commit the offence of Riddah (apostasy); (2) Whoever commits 
apostasy shall be asked to repent within a period decided by the court and if he insisted on his apostasy and was 
not a new convert he shall be punished with death; (3) Punishment for apostasy lapses if the apostate refrained 
from apostasy before the execution’.  
30 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: 
Mashood A Baderin (4 September 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/69, paras 29, 43. 
31 See ‘Sudan: Death Penalty Pronounced in Apostasy Case’ (FIDH, 20 May 2014) 
<www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/sudan/15355-sudan-death-penalty-pronounced-in-apostasy-case>. 
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that of international human rights’.32 He also noted that in Sudan’s second periodic 
submission to the Human Rights Committee on the implementation of the ICCPR, 
the State expressed that the Act does not criminalise conversion from Islam ‘but 
only the manifestation of such conversion if such manifestation affects public 
safety’.33  
33. This interpretation was supported by Court of Appeal judge, Osman Atigani 
Mahmoud, who quashed the conviction observing that:  
Sudanese law does not criminalise the abstract offence of 
apostasy unless it is combined with manifestation and 
propagation. This view is adopted by those who believe that the 
offence of apostasy applies only to apostates who fight against 
Islam. The Sudanese law only criminalises the conduct of fighter 
apostate and not the Muslim who only changed his religion.34 
34. Mahmoud held that in order to prove the apostasy charge, Meriam would need to 
have ‘stated that she is Muslim and that she propagates or publicly promotes the 
renunciation of the creed of Islam’.35 Nevertheless, Meriam’s acquittal was in fact 
a result of her being deemed mentally unfit, by a majority of two to one, as identified 
by stakeholders in Sudan’s Universal Periodic Review.36 Meriam’s case 
demonstrated a lack of appropriate judicial training in Sudan, particularly at the 
lower bench of the judiciary. 
35. Not only was Meriam’s case at odds with Islamic law but a clear violation of 
international law. Article 18 of the ICCPR safeguards freedom of religion and the 
General Comment No. 22 states that Article 18 ‘does not permit any limitations 
whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or to have or adopt a religion 
or belief of one’s choice.’37 The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 
Belief affirmed these rights are ‘fundamental to a democratic society and individual 
self-fulfilment and are foundational to the enjoyment of human rights’.38  
36. The criminalisation of apostasy in this context and, if found guilty, the imposition 
of the death penalty is a clear violation of freedom of religion as well as the right to 
life pursuant to Article 6 of the ICCPR. 
 
32 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: 
Mashood A Baderin (4 September 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/69, para 43. 
33 ibid para 44; Human Rights Committee, ‘Second Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 1992: Sudan’ (13 
March 1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/75/Add.2, para 127. 
34 Unofficial translation of Appeal Court Judgement of 23 June 2014, Abrar Alhadi Mohammed Abdallah and 
Others Trial (on file with author). 
35 ibid. 
36 JS7 UPR Submission, para 9 available at <www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/sudan/session_25_-
_may_2016/js7_upr25_sdn_e_main.pdf>. See also UNHRC, ‘Summary Prepared by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15(b) of the Annex to Human Rights Council 
Resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council Resolution 16/21: Sudan’ (19 February 2016) UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/25/SDN/3, para 51.  
37 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 on the Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (30 
July 1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 3.  
38 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief (5 March 2019) 
UN Doc A/HRC/40/58, para 55.  
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37. The Human Rights Committee has emphasised that the death penalty cannot be 
applied as a sanction against conduct whose very criminalization violates the 
Covenant, including apostasy.39  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
38. The criminalisation of apostasy in Islamic law is at clear odds with the concept of 
freedom of religion or belief. Moreover, the punishment for the offence, the death 
penalty, rests on questionable jurisprudential grounds due to the variance and 
ambiguity in the source-texts of Islamic law.  
39. There is a distinction between apostasy simpliciter and political apostasy. It should 
be noted that premodern Muslim jurists who endorsed the death penalty for apostasy 
were writing from a specific socio-political context. The intent and context of 
apostasy laws would be lost in a modern application due to being superimposed 
onto quite different structures of law and governance. Geopolitics have radically 
shifted from the premodern period to the modern era of globalisation.   
40. It is therefore entirely plausible that the death penalty is predicated on the political 
element of apostasy which is tied with hostility and war. Insisting on the death 
penalty for the apostate demonstrates a lack of critical awareness since the notion 
of apostasy is often employed by political and religious authorities to curtail 
freedom of religion. 
41. Muslim states which criminalise apostasy must be urged to uphold the right to 
freedom of religion and belief without discrimination, in accordance to both Islamic 
law and international law. There needs to be adequate judicial training provided at 
all stages of the judiciary to prevent violation(s) of this fundamental right.  
42. The decriminalisation of apostasy would signal a very significant step in the 
promotion of freedom of religion or belief within Muslim states.   
 
Submitted by:  
 
 
Dr Amna Nazir 
Associate Director at the BCU Centre for Human Rights  
 
 
39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 on the Right to Life (3 September 2019) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/36, para 36. 
